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Volume 1:  Technical Consultation Report 
 
1.0 Authorization and Notification 
Michael Gilbert, the NESC Chief Engineer at LaRC, was the initiator of this activity. 
David Hamilton, the NESC Chief Engineer at JSC, performed the initial evaluation of 
this item. Per the official minutes, the NESC Review Board (NRB) approved this activity 
as a technical consultation on 27 April 2004. The key stakeholders for this consultation 
report are the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and the International Space Station (ISS) 
Program.
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3.0 Team Members 
Several members of the NESC Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) Super 
Problem Resolution team (SPRT) have been providing high-level oversight of the 
technical and programmatic activities surrounding the ORM since July 2004.  This small 
group of GN&C specialists was augmented with additional NESC personnel to form a 
diverse ORM Peer Review Team capable of performing both an overall system-level 
assessment of the ORM and a detailed technical interrogation in key identified areas of 
interest. The following individuals comprised the June 2005 NESC ORM Peer Review 
Team: 
 
Name Title Affiliation Phone E-Mail 
Neil Dennehy GN&C Discipline 
Engineer 
NESC, LaRC 301/286-5696 Cornelius.J.Dennehy@nasa.gov 
Frank Bauer GN&C SPRT NESC, ARC 202/358-0897 Frank.H.Bauer @nasa.gov 
Karl Bilimoria GN&C SPRT NESC, HQ 650-604-1638 Karl.Bilimoria@nasa.gov 
Dennis Dillman Chief Engineer NESC, HQ 202/358-1759 Dennis.B.Dillman@nasa.gov 
Michael Gilbert Chief Engineer NESC, LaRC 757/864-2839 michael.g.gilbert@nasa.gov 
Michael Hagopian GSFC Chief 
Engineer 
NESC, LaRC 301/286-6732 Michael.hagopian@nasa.gov 
Tuyen Hua GN&C SPRT NESC, JSC 281/483-8296 Tuyen.Hua-1@nasa.gov 
Dexter Johnson GN&C SPRT NESC, GRC 216/433-6046 Dexter.Johnson@nasa.gov 
Jay Leggett NESC Systems 
Engineering Office 
NESC, JSC 281/483-6458 Jay.A.Leggett@nasa.gov 
Peiman Maghami GN&C SPRT NESC, GSFC 301/286-6615 Peiman.Maghami@nasa.gov 
David Mangus GN&C SPRT NESC, GSFC 301/286-2649 David.J.Mangus@nasa.gov 
Scott Starin GN&C SPRT NESC, GSFC 301/286-9627 Scott.Starin@nasa.gov 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
The intent of this Technical Consultation Report is to document the finding and 
recommendations of the NESC Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) Peer Review conducted 
at NASA’s Johnson Space Center (JSC) with the ORM Working Group (WG) over the 
period 8-10 June 2005.  
 
Background 
 
The ORM is a complex, untested, and hazardous human/robotic contingency operation 
spread over three (3) days. It has been developed by JSC to support the repair of entry 
critical Thermal Protection System (TPS) tile and Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) 
damage at locations that cannot be reached, with the Orbiter docked to ISS, by either the 
Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) or the Space Station Remote Manipulator 
System (SSRMS). As depicted in Figure 4.0-1 the ORM has been designed and 
developed to position the Orbiter such that 100 percent of the TPS tile is within reach of 
an EVA astronaut on the SSRMS. The ORM entails undocking the Orbiter from the ISS 
using the SRMS, followed directly by the SRMS maneuvering of the Orbiter through a 
series pre-planned (and auto-sequenced) trajectory waypoints, in close proximity to the 
ISS, to a repair orientation accessible by Extravehicular Activity (EVA) astronauts 
positioned on the SSRMS.  
Repair Access (Pre Node 2)
(Docked & ORM: Lab and MBS Worksites 4 & 5)
Panel 15
No access
Access with SRMS when docked
ORM Access
Docked Access or ORM 
Docked Access Only
No Access
Panel 11
 
Figure 4.0-1.  Orbiter Repair Access Diagram   
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The Space Shuttle Project (SSP) considers the ORM to be a contingency operation for 
flights LF1-10A. There is no plan for the Project to certify the ORM. The initial ORM 
plan called for all analyses to be complete and the operational procedures to be ready for 
STS-114. That initial plan has been overcome by events.  While much progress has been 
made over the last several months in many of the analytical areas, especially the 
characterization of the repair worksite dynamics, the complete technical solution for the 
ORM is still being developed at JSC on a “best efforts” basis by multiple engineering and 
operational organizations. 
 
The NESC team’s position is that, compared to the Orbiter/ISS/SRMS/SSRMS 
experience base, the ORM has a high-degree of complexity, uncertainty and therefore 
risk to crew and the flight structures. It involves close proximity movements of the 
Orbiter, ISS, the SRMS, the SSRMS structures and requires split-crew astronaut 
operations inside the Orbiter and ISS as well as EVA astronauts on the SSRMS to 
perform the repairs.  
Peer Review Approach and Objectives  
 
The motivation for the Peer Review was derived from NESC’s concern that ORM 
represents new and unfamiliar operations that are complex and pose risks (both know and 
unknown) to the crew and flight systems. The team’s approach to performing this most 
recent ORM peer review was twofold. The team first reviewed the ORM from a “big 
picture” systems-level viewpoint to determine, to the extent a short duration review such 
as this would permit, if the ORM WG missed any key aspects of the problem. The team 
then investigated a few key technical areas to evaluate the depth and completeness of 
some of the ORM WG’s analysis, modeling and simulation work.    
 
Specific objectives of the NESC ORM Peer Review were: 
 
1) To assess the breadth of the ORM technical solution at a systems–level.   
  
2) To assess the status, depth, and completeness of the ORM pre-launch modeling, 
simulation and analysis work performed to date. 
 
3) To determine what ORM work remains to be completed.  
 
4) To assess the ORM operational readiness for STS-114.  
 
5) To understand the risks associated with performing the ORM and determine if 
there are any “showstoppers.”   
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6) To determine if the ORM WG was proceeding down the path towards a 
successful ORM. 
ORM Operations  
 
The ORM is a complex contingency operation that cannot be fully validated on the 
ground prior to first use. Moreover the ORM is a “first of a kind” operation whose 
execution will require both the flight hardware and the crew to operate in a non-standard 
manner that is significantly outside the nominal operational experience regime. If 
invoked the ORM would be the first SRMS “Heavy Payload” operation and would also 
be the first use of the SRMS for undocking the Orbiter from the ISS. The heaviest SRMS 
payload to date has been the Functional Energy Block (known as FGB), which had a 
mass of approximately 48,000 pounds. Note also that SRMS-assisted docking operations 
have not been done since STS-88/2A, which was the first ISS assembly mission, in 1998.       
 
It is important to recognize that “ORM” is a broad term that covers the end-to-end 
operation of first undocking the Orbiter, SRMS maneuvering of the Orbiter via multiple 
prescribed trajectory waypoints to the repair position, the subsequent Orbiter/EVA 
astronaut dynamic (relative motion) interactions at the repair worksite and the 
maneuvering and redocking of the Orbiter following completion of the repairs.  
 
During the ORM, as mentioned above, the Orbiter is maneuvered by the SRMS through 
multiple pre-determined trajectory waypoints in an auto-sequenced manner. There are in 
fact a total of thirteen (13) maneuver waypoints during this operation. Early on in the 
ORM dynamics and controls analysis process the JSC GN&C team concluded that the 
existing as-is ISS CMG-based attitude control system did not have sufficient 
capability/authority to stabilize the various stack configurations during the SRMS 
maneuvering of the Orbiter through the multiple waypoints. During the ORM the ISS 
GN&C system alone is used to control the attitude of the entire ISS/Orbiter stack. The 
Orbiter GN&C system is in a passive state (with its control actuators not enabled) and it 
is not used to control the dynamics of the stack. In order to provide adequate attitude 
control of the ORM stack configurations from Waypoints 1-13, a new ORM-specific 
controller and operational mode was designed by the JSC GN&C team to provide stable 
operational performance. This new GN&C operational mode, referred to as the United 
States (US) Thruster-Only (USTO) mode, uses the existing US CMG Proportional-
Derivative (PD) control law algorithm to only command Russian Segment (RS) Service 
Module (SM) thrusters in a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) mode. The JSC GN&C team 
selected thrusters (instead of the CMG’s) as the ORM control actuators in order to 
provide good attitude control performance while achieving acceptable Orbiter relative 
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motion with respect to the ISS. The CMG’s are not used at all, during ORM maneuvering 
of the Orbiter, to generate attitude control torques. 
 
The ORM is a relatively long duration (3 days) multi-step process that begins with the 
Orbiter docked to the ISS and, from a dynamics and control perspective, includes the 
following specific events:   
 
1)  Grappling of ISS by the SRMS (with ISS under normal CMG MM control).  
 
2)  SRMS controlled undocking of the Orbiter from ISS and subsequent maneuvering to 
 Waypoint 1 (with ISS under normal CMG MM control).*  
 
3)  Transition of ISS GN&C from normal Control Moment Gyro (CMG)-based MM 
 control mode to the US Thrusters Only (USTO) thruster-based attitude hold control 
 mode. The CMG’s are placed in a free drift mode.*      
 
4)  Maneuvering of the Orbiter, via auto-sequenced SRMS motion, from Waypoint 1 to 
 the Overnight Park Position (Waypoint 8) with the ISS under USTO thruster-based 
 attitude hold control.*  
 
5)  Transition of ISS GN&C from USTO thruster-based attitude hold control back to 
 normal CMG-based MM control at the Overnight Park Position. * 
 
6)  Maintaining the Orbiter/ISS stack in a Torque Equilibrium Attitude (TEA) at the 
Overnight Park Position (Waypoint 8) under normal CMG MM control.*  
 
7)  Transition of ISS GN&C from normal CMG-based MM control to USTO thruster 
 based attitude hold control. The CMG’s are placed in a free drift mode.       
 
8)  Maneuvering of the Orbiter, via auto-sequenced SRMS motion, from the Overnight 
 Park Position (Waypoint 8) to the Repair Position (Waypoint 13) with the ISS under 
 USTO thruster-based attitude hold control.*   
 
9)  Transition of ISS GN&C from USTO thruster-based attitude hold control back to 
 normal CMG-based MM control at the Repair Position. * 
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10) Providing a sufficiently stable repair worksite dynamic environment, with the ISS 
 under CMG-based MM control, to permit the required TPS tile or RCC repair by 
 EVA astronauts positioned on the SSRMS affixed to ISS.* 
 
11) Post-repair maneuvering and re-docking of the Orbiter, by performing Step 9 through 
 Step 1 in reverse order.* 
  
• Note: The * indicates a first time operational occurrence.  
Figure 4.0-2 depicts the Orbiter at the ORM overnight park position while Figures 4.0-3 
and 4.0-4 illustrate the Orbiter at the ORM repair position.   
 
 
 
 
Overnight Park Position
 
 
Figure 4.0-2.  Orbiter at the ORM Overnight Park Position 
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Repair Position
 
Figure 4.0-3.  Orbiter at the ORM Repair Position  (with respect to ISS) 
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ORM Repair Position
 
 
Figure 4.0-4.   Orbiter at the ORM Repair Position (Side View) 
Summary of Key Findings and Recommendations   
 
The NESC team had ten (10) findings and five (5) recommendations coming from the 
limited (2.5 day) “snapshot” pre-RTF review of the ORM status. Some of these findings 
and recommendations address known technical concerns with specific aspects of the 
GN&C system design and performance. Others relate to system level concerns with the 
quantity of known open work, the need to integrate and prioritize activities across 
organizations, and the strategic implementation of on-orbit checks into the operational 
plan to account for remaining ORM uncertainties.   
 
The team found that that while the ORM WG structure was a useful way to share 
information between multiple organizations there apparently is no single person tasked 
with coordinating/managing the overall effort, from an end-to-end system perspective, on 
a full-time dedicated basis. It is the team’s position that the lack of a dedicated full-time 
ORM Lead Engineer has impacted, and continues to impact, the integration and 
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prioritization of open ORM analytical and operational planning work. A full-time ORM 
Lead Engineer, with a system-wide perspective, is critically needed to both prioritize and 
schedule completion dates for all remaining ORM open work based upon negotiated 
agreements with appropriate resource managers. This ORM engineering lead could be 
positioned to efficiently identify and complete remaining work in preparation for launch, 
to authoritatively communicate ORM status and capability to the SSP, and to support real 
time on-orbit analysis and decision-making should the ORM be invoked.  
 
One of the team’s primary technical concerns focuses on low reported stability margins 
for the ISS USTO attitude control system. In particular, the team was very concerned 
with low reported phase margins - as low as 4.5 degrees in one specific case.  
Specifically “phase margin” is defined as the amount of additional phase lag (at the gain 
crossover frequency) that is required to bring the system to the verge of instability     
Therefore, these low phase margins indicate that, under certain operating conditions, the 
ISS attitude control system could be operating very near the boundary of stability.  
  
In classical linear control system theory gain and phase margins are typically used as 
figure-of-merit measures indicating the degree of stability in a closed-loop feedback 
system. Control system designers gain important insights into a control system’s 
robustness to uncertainty by computing and evaluating the gain and phase margins. 
Uncertainty can manifest itself in a control system in several ways such as un-modeled 
plant dynamics (that perhaps could be excited by the control system), and/or non-
linearities that were not included in the plant model (or perhaps not known to exist) 
and/or unknown/unanticipated variations in plant parameter values. Standard engineering 
best practice guidelines suggest that a control system possess both a minimum of 30 
degrees of phase margin, and a minimum of 6 dB of gain margin to adequately provide 
robustness to uncertainty.   
 
 The team’s position is that the low reported phase margins are not acceptable given that:  
 
a)  the ORM is a first-of-a-kind maneuver,  
 
b)  there is limited experience with a USTO type controller that combines the US 
CMG control law algorithm with the RS SM  thrusters,  
 
c)  the on/off control of the thrusters is implemented via the PWM such that the exact 
time for the execution of a thruster firing is variable and depends on the command 
levels, and  
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d)  effects of sensor dynamics, as well as some discretization effects, do not seem to 
have been included in the GN&C ORM analyses. The belief/posture that these 
low phase margins, which are based on a linear model of the SRMS, are overly 
conservative is not a sufficient basis to proceed with the current USTO controller 
design.   
 
It is the position of the team that the critical importance of maintaining controller stability 
is paramount in the case of the ORM where the Orbiter-to-ISS maneuver clearances are 
tight. Controller instability could directly lead to collision and damage/loss of the 
Orbiter/ISS stack.   
 
It is also the position of the team that potentially low controller margins coupled with 
remaining (both known and unknown) uncertainties dictate that deliberate ORM steps 
with engineering checks be embedded into the operations plans/procedures to evaluate 
ORM performance and gain confidence prior to these key activities.  This philosophy 
should be extended to address other areas of uncertainty like the dynamic worksite 
environment.  Astronauts can excite the complex control-structure system stack from a 
safe position near the repair site, by dry running the nominal repair steps, to gain 
confidence prior to the actual repair.  It may be possible that previous work, including 
early planning for the ORM Demonstration Task Objective (DTO), can be leveraged to 
determine what is feasible and appropriate. 
 
Summary Remarks  
 
Based upon cursory review, the team recognizes that the majority of the analysis work 
has already been performed by the ORM WG to prepare for the eventuality where the 
ORM is needed to provide accessibility for Orbiter repairs. It is equally clear that several 
critical items of analytic open work, the execution of which reduces ORM uncertainty, 
will need to be completed prior to safely invoking the ORM operationally. In addition to 
the known list of open analysis work, recommendations have been formulated, and 
captured in this report, for specific additional analyses and model/simulation validations 
steps to be performed before the first use of the ORM is undertaken.  
 
Equally clear to the team is that the definition and implementation of critically needed 
operational on-orbit safeguards/checks for the ORM are lagging the analysis. These 
operational safeguards/checks would support the necessary real time on-orbit analysis, 
performance monitoring, and dynamic behavior during both the maneuver of the Orbiter 
and during the repair process. The team has therefore formulated a set of operationally 
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related recommendations that, when completed, will also have the positive effect of 
reducing ORM uncertainty.   
 
It is the team’s position that the above set of five NESC prioritized recommendations 
represents the minimum set of ORM analytical and operational planning tasks, needed to 
be implemented, in order for the ORM to be considered as a viable contingency for the 
STS-114 mission. Furthermore, the team’s position is that ORM contingency operations 
should not be invoked until, at a minimum, all five of the above prioritized 
recommendations have been addressed by the SSP. 
 
Taken together, team’s analytical and operational recommendations represent the best set 
of the “necessary conditions” needed to reduce ORM uncertainty prior to first use. Given 
that the Peer Review team performed only a cursory review of the ORM status it would 
be inappropriate and presumptuous to claim that our recommendations represent the 
complete set of “sufficient conditions” for a successful ORM. Along these lines the team 
recommends that a full-time ORM WG Lead Engineer be named to prioritize the known 
open work prior to launch and to be in a position to identify unknown issues/problems as 
they emerge.  
Comment on the Project’s OBSS Alternative to the ORM  
 
Note that JSC has also identified, and is currently investigating, the feasibility of using 
the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) 50-foot boom extension to the SRMS as an 
alternative method of accessing 100 percent of the TPS tiles. The NESC team did not 
assess the details of this OBSS alternative as part of this 8-10 June 2005 peer review. The 
team was however exposed to some of the OBSS Project approach to assessing the OBSS 
alternative and its pros/cons relative to the ORM.  
 
Based upon only the limited information presented, the team’s viewpoint is, provided the 
EVA astronaut on the end of the OBSS boom has sufficient dynamic stability to effect 
repairs, this OBSS alternative intrinsically appears to be a significantly lower risk 
contingency operation compared to the ORM. The team observed that many of the same 
individuals supporting the ORM are also supporting the OBSS feasibility assessment 
activity and many of the same analytical tools, models, and simulation techniques are 
being employed. It is likely, therefore, that many of the NESC’s ORM recommendations 
may be applicable to the OBSS alternative.   
 
The team would like to thank the entire ORM WG and the ORM leads, Ladonna Miller 
and Curt Larsen from the SSP and Bill Spetch from the ISS Program, for their openness 
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and frank dialog throughout our consultation activity.  This was much appreciated and 
was crucial in NESC getting a good understanding of the ORM analyses, plans and 
potential risks. 
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5.0 Consultation Plan 
The NESC initially became involved in the ORM in March 2004 when LaRC engineers 
expressed concerns over the complex dynamics and control of the Orbiter and ISS during 
the proposed ORM operation. The NESC Review Board (NRB) acted to formally 
authorize a Peer Review Consultation on the ORM (04-034-E - ISS/Shuttle Flip 
Maneuver for TPS Repair) and the GN&C NESC Discipline Expert (NDE) conducted an 
initial Peer-Review of the ORM WG modeling and analysis efforts at JSC in August 
2004. Since that time members of the NESC GN&C SPRT have maintained oversight of 
ORM development progress via the weekly ORM WG telecons. In April 2005, a detailed 
NESC status report of the ORM was presented to the NRB by Frank Bauer (see 
Appendix D).  Subsequently the ORM was added to the NESC’s “STS-114 Return to 
Flight (RTF) Constraints – Open Work” list as a Red item (which is defined as 
“Technical Solution in Development”) to be tracked and reported on as part of NESC’s 
RTF pre-launch presentations at the SSP Flight Readiness Review (FRR), Shuttle Safety 
and Mission Assurance Readiness Review (SMARR), and other related reviews. The 
NRB also agreed upon the SPRT’s recommendation to perform another Peer Review 
Consultation prior to the launch of STS-114. Planning and negotiation meetings were 
held between the SSP and NESC in May 2005 to define the scope/content of the Peer 
Review and to set a mutually agreeable date for holding this review (June 8-10 2005).     
 
The motivation for the peer review was derived from NESC’s concern that ORM 
represents new and unfamiliar operations that are complex and pose risks (both known 
and unknown) to the crew and flight systems. The team’s approach to performing this 
most recent ORM peer review was twofold. The team first reviewed the ORM from a 
“big picture” systems-level viewpoint to determine, to the extent a short duration review 
such as this would permit, if the ORM WG missed any key aspects of the problem. Then 
as a follow-up, the team investigated key technical areas to evaluate the depth and 
completeness of some of the ORM WG’s analysis, modeling and simulation work.    
 
Specific objectives of the NESC ORM Peer Review were: 
 
1) To assess the breadth of the ORM technical solution at a systems–level.   
   
2) To assess the status, depth, and completeness of the ORM pre-launch modeling, 
simulation and analysis work performed to date. 
 
3) To determine what ORM work remains to be completed.  
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4) To assess the ORM operational readiness for STS-114.  
5) To understand the risks associated with performing the ORM and determine if 
there are any “showstoppers.” 
  
6) To determine if the ORM WG was proceeding down the path towards a 
successful ORM.  
 
The purpose of the ORM Peer Review Team was to investigate the models, methodology, 
and overall use of the ORM as a safe repair method.  The specific topics covered during 
the NESC ORM Peer Review Process, over the period 8-10 June 2005, are identified in 
the review agenda provided for reference in Appendix B.  
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6.0 Description of Problem, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment 
The JSC driver for developing the ORM contingency capability is unambiguous. The 
ORM represents one possible solution to the problem that the majority (approximately 60 
percent) of the TPS tile acreage is unreachable by the SRMS alone, or even in 
combination with the SSRMS, when the Orbiter is docked to ISS. (See Figure 4.0-1)  The 
ORM has been designed and developed to position the Orbiter such that 100 percent of 
the TPS tile is within reach of an EVA astronaut on the SSRMS. 
 
The ORM is a complex contingency operation that cannot be fully validated on the 
ground prior to first use. Moreover, the ORM is a “first of a kind” operation whose 
execution will require both the flight hardware and the crew to operate in a non-standard 
manner that is significantly outside the nominal operational experience regime.  For 
example, consider that normally, the SRMS lifts and deploys payloads with mass and 
inertias much less than the Orbiter.  In all operational cases to-date, the Orbiter can be 
thought of as an “infinite mass” that reacts against the much smaller payload mass.  The 
SRMS uses this “infinite” reactive mass to help move the payload in the proper position 
(translation and orientation).  However, for the ORM, the Orbiter effectively becomes the 
payload that reacts against the more massive ISS.  It should be noted that the largest 
payload manipulated by the SRMS to-date has been the 48,000 pound FGB.  The FGB 
mass is approximately an order of magnitude less than the Orbiter’s mass of 
approximately 240,000 pounds. Extending SRMS robotic operations from a FGB-class 
payload to the Orbiter, as the payload, is a significant extrapolation. In December 2004, 
the SRMS was certified for Heavy Payload mass operations, following an extensive 
series of low-speed robotic joint ground tests and associated servo-loop model updates. If 
invoked the ORM would be the first SRMS “Heavy Payload” operation. The ORM would 
also be the first use of the SRMS for undocking the Orbiter from the ISS. 
 
It is important to recognize that “ORM” is a broad term that covers the end-to-end 
operation of undocking/maneuvering the Orbiter, via the SRMS, to the repair position, 
the subsequent Orbiter/EVA astronaut dynamic (relative motion) interactions at the repair 
worksite, and the maneuvering and redocking of the Orbiter following completion of the 
repairs. The ORM is a relatively long duration (3 days), multi-step process that begins 
with the Orbiter docked to the ISS and, from a dynamics and control perspective, entails 
the following specific events:   
 
1)  Grappling of ISS by the SRMS.  
 
2)  SRMS controlled undocking of the Orbiter from ISS.  
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3)  Transitioning ISS from nominal CMG-based momentum management control to 
 thruster-based attitude hold control.  
   
4)  Maneuvering of the Orbiter, via the SRMS, to an interim Overnight Park Position.  
 
5)  Transitioning ISS from thruster-based attitude hold control to CMG-based 
 momentum management control. 
 
6)  Maintaining the Orbiter/ISS stack in the Overnight Park Position.  
 
7)  Maneuvering of the Orbiter, via the SRMS, from the Overnight Park Position to the 
 repair position with the ISS under Thruster-based attitude hold control.  
 
8)  Providing a sufficiently stable repair worksite environment, with the ISS under CMG 
 based momentum management control, to permit the required tile or RCC repair by 
 EVA astronauts positioned on the SSRMS affixed to ISS. 
 
9)  Post-repair maneuvering and re-docking of the Orbiter. 
 
Figure 4.0-2 depicts the Orbiter at the ORM overnight park position while Figures 4.0-3 
and 4.0-4 illustrate the Orbiter at the ORM repair position. 
 
Early on in the ORM dynamics and controls analysis process, the JSC GN&C team 
concluded that the existing as-is ISS CMG-based attitude control system did not have 
sufficient capability/authority to stabilize the various stack configurations during the 
SRMS maneuvering of the Orbiter through the multiple waypoints. During the ORM, the 
ISS GN&C system alone is used to control the attitude of the entire ISS/Orbiter stack. 
The Orbiter GN&C system is in a passive state (with its control actuators not enabled), 
and it is not used to control the dynamics of the stack. In order to provide adequate 
attitude control of the ORM stack configurations from Waypoints 1-13, a new ORM-
specific controller and operational mode was designed by the JSC GN&C team to 
provide stable operational performance. This new GN&C operational mode, referred to 
as the USTO mode, uses the existing US CMG PD control law algorithm to only 
command, using a pulse width modulated implementation, the Russian thrusters. 
Thrusters were selected over the CMG’s, as the desired ORM control actuators in order 
to provide good attitude control performance, while achieving acceptable Orbiter relative 
motion with respect to the ISS. 
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Effectively, the normal control torque command, generated by the CMG PD controller is 
converted to a momentum change command (by multiplying it with the PWM period) 
and then sent to the RS SM, where specific thrusters are fired for specific on-times in 
order to achieve the requested momentum change. At the same time the CMG actuator 
torque command is set to zero.  Hence, the CMG’s are not used during ORM 
maneuvering of the Orbiter to generate attitude control torques. Functionally, this mode is 
mechanized in the ISS GN&C flight software, by enabling the existing CMG Thruster 
Assist (TA) mode with its CMG control torque limit parameter set to zero, and by setting 
the parameter defining the minimum time between CMG desaturations (i.e., CMG 
momentum unloading via thruster firings) equal to the PWM period. 
 
The ORM is an operation with high levels of uncertainty involving close proximity 
movements of flight structures, limited back-out opportunities and visibility, and high 
potential for adverse Control-Structure Interaction (CSI) between control systems, 
possibly resulting in large or unstable relative motion between the Orbiter repair 
worksite, the EVA Astronauts positioned on the SSRMS, and the ISS.   
 
The ORM presents a very challenging system-level modeling, simulation and problem - a 
multi-disciplinary ORM WG and operations organization at JSC.   The ORM WG 
provides a much needed forum for coordination and exchange of information between the 
various organizations performing analysis.  Although no new hardware is being 
developed for the ORM, the analyses required to ensure the feasibility and safety of this 
repair option present a tremendous analysis integration challenge 
 
 Note that JSC has also identified and is currently investigating the feasibility of using the 
OBSS 50-foot boom extension to the SRMS as an alternative method of accessing 100 
percent of the TPS tiles. The NESC team did not assess the OBSS option but, provided 
the EVA astronaut on the end of the OBSS boom has sufficient dynamic stability to 
effect repairs, this OBSS alternative intrinsically appears to be a significantly lower risk 
contingency operation compared to the ORM.    
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7.0 Data Analysis 
The NESC team did not perform any independent analysis, modeling, or simulation of 
the ORM dynamics and controls as part of this peer review process.  
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8.0 Findings and Recommendations 
8.1 Findings  
Based upon the data/information conveyed during our meetings at JSC over the period 8-
10 June 2005 the ORM Peer Review Team compiled the following findings:   
 
F-1  There is a considerable amount of critical open work, in both the ORM analytical 
and operational planning areas, that absolutely must be completed prior to first 
use of ORM. These key pieces of open work, not in priority order, are listed in 
Table 8.1-1. 
 
F-2 While many of the ORM technical analyses appear to be quite comprehensive 
with sufficient depth/rigor, it is not apparent that all the results of these analyses 
have been very well integrated and used to systematically drive the development 
of all the necessary ORM flight/ground operations plans and procedures. The 
most likely reason for this situation is that there appears to be no single person 
tasked with coordinating/managing the overall effort on a full-time dedicated 
basis. It is the team’s position that the lack of a dedicated full time ORM Lead 
Engineer has impacted, and continues to impact, the integration and prioritization 
of open ORM analytical and operational planning work. A full-time ORM Lead 
Engineer, with a system-wide perspective, is critically needed to both prioritize 
and schedule completion dates for all remaining ORM open work based upon 
negotiated agreements with appropriate resource managers. 
 
F-3 The ORM is an operation that the SSP recognizes as complex and risky.  The SSP 
is actively studying the risk trades for accessing a repair worksite using ORM as 
well as other access methods. Currently, the SSP is considering, in descending 
hierarchical order, three alternative methods of gaining access to TPS tile and 
RCC repair worksites:  
 
1)  access by use of SRMS/ SSRMS robotic arms, 
  
2)  access by use of the SRMS with the OBSS 50-foot boom attached, and 
  
3) ORM access. The on orbit contingency decision flow process/policy 
 defining specifically when the ORM will be operationally invoked was 
 pending on the results of the previously mentioned risk trades and had not 
 been finalized by the SSP at the time of the peer review. 
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F-4 GN&C ORM analyses indicate that the smallest phase margins for the ISS USTO 
controller can go as low as 4.5 degrees. This very low phase margin occurs at the 
Waypoint 9 position using the “perturbed” dynamic model, where a 20 percent 
uncertainty is included for both modal frequencies and modal amplitudes, with a 
2-second delay in execution of the thruster commands. Likewise, the phase 
margin for the overnight parking configuration is at 5.5 degrees. The frequency 
associated with these margins is at 0.016 Hz, which is close to the Nyquist 
frequency (0.025 Hz). The proximity of the flexible mode to the Nyquist 
frequency, as well as the fact that in this particular control system design the 
flexible modes below 0.04 Hz are phase stabilized, raise stability robustness  
issues in view of model uncertainties in modal frequencies, damping, etc. 
Moreover, aliasing effects may become a problem and need to be considered. The 
team’s position is that these very low phase margins are not acceptable given that:  
 
a)  the ORM is a first-of-a-kind maneuver,  
 
b)  there is limited experience with a USTO type controller that combines a US 
 controller with the Russian thrusters,  
 
c)  the on/off control of the thrusters is implemented via a Pulse Width Modulator 
 (PWM) such that the exact time for the execution of a thruster firing is 
 variable and depends on the command levels, and  
 
d)  that effects of sensor dynamics, as well as some discretization effects, do not 
 seem to have been included in the GN&C ORM analyses.  
 
The belief that these low phase margins, which are based on a linear model of the 
SRMS, are overly conservative is not a sufficient basis to proceed with the current 
USTO controller design.  It is the position of the team that the ISS controller 
stability margins must either be re-computed with a high fidelity model (which 
includes the 20 percent variation in modal frequencies of the SRMS as well as 
appropriate modal damping/amplitude uncertainties), and shown to be adequate, 
or a new/modified ISS attitude controller design must be developed and 
incorporated. 
 
F-5 The ability of the rate-damping controller to recover the stack from a free drift (at 
maximum nominal angular velocities) at either of the parking positions (both the 
overnight park and repair waypoints), is not fully clear to the team.  This is 
equally the case for any of the waypoints for which the analysis has indicated that 
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direct recovery without reorienting the SRMS, is not possible. Additionally, there 
are some maneuver waypoints for which the analysis has indicated the direct 
recovery from free drift rate buildup (resulting from a loss of ISS attitude control) 
is not possible without a reorientation of the SRMS. For example, analysis has 
shown it is not possible for the ISS rate-damping controller to recover the stack, 
from maximum free drift angular velocities, at either of the overnight park 
position waypoint or the repair position waypoints. The general finding here is, 
therefore, if the ISS loses attitude control during the ORM the Orbiter may, 
depending on which maneuver waypoint it is at or which two waypoints it is 
between, have to be reoriented with the SRMS back to a recoverable waypoint 
before ISS attitude control can be restored. The implication is that failure of the 
SRMS during ORM such that the Orbiter cannot be reoriented, depending on the 
orientation at the time of failure, could preclude  
 
a)  rebirthing of the Orbiter to the ISS and recovery of the Orbiter ORM crew,  
 
b)  establishment of a favorable Torque-Equilibrium-Attitude (TEA) ISS attitude 
 control with the Orbiter attached,  
 
c) re-establishment of ISS attitude control From free-drift if the ISS attitude 
 control goes off-line, and/or  
 
d) Orbiter separation from the ISS for redocking. 
 
F-6 The ORM WG’s ability to reuse models from their legacy TRICK simulation 
library environment, and their incremental “build-then-test” approach for the 
ORM simulation development, were both viewed by the team as being very 
positive and impressive. Their use of heritage models, recognizing that they are 
operating well out of the experience range and used Kane’s equations to 
independently verify the work, were all very positive.  The matching results from 
the independent comparison check of the newly developed (by the ER Robotics 
Engineering organization) integrated ORM simulation (which represents a rigid 
Orbiter, a flexible SRMS and a rigid ISS model) in the TRICK simulation 
environment against the functionally equivalent Station/Orbiter Multibody 
Berthing Analysis Tool (SOMBAT)-based simulation (which is an existing 
simulation developed by the EG GN&C engineering organization)  is a major step 
in verifying the newly developed ER ORM simulation. However, another critical 
independent simulation cross-check remains to be performed between the ER-
developed Worksite Dynamics (WSD) Simulation (which represents the complete 
end-to-end system dynamics including ISS flexible dynamics and the EVA 
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astronaut on the SSRMS) and the functionally equivalent EG-developed 
SOMBAT-based simulation.   
 
F-7 No Contingency Action Plan has been developed for the on-orbit real-time ORM 
WSD analysis.  
 
F-8 The ORM planned implementation relies heavily on the human-in-loop approach 
to fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR) at the system level. Although 
each element of the stack (ISS, Shuttle, SRMS, and the SSRMS) has their 
respective FDIR systems, the stack as whole will have to rely on the situational 
awareness of the astronauts on the ISS, and on the Orbiter, to assure the health 
and safety of the system. This requires extensive training, and well-defined 
protocols for the astronauts, so that they may act prudently and quickly to 
unforeseen anomalies that may affect this maneuver.  The team also found that, 
given the continuous auto-sequenced nature of the SRMS maneuvering of the 
Orbiter, there are no “hold and monitor” steps planned for each SRMS maneuver 
trajectory waypoints beyond Waypoint 1. No clearly defined realtime “Go/No 
Go” ORM maneuver criteria have been developed based upon the collection, 
analysis and monitoring of telemetry/camera video data.   
 
F-9 Separation of the Orbiter from the ISS during ORM, if required, must be 
performed passively, using orbital dynamics from the overnight park position, 
with the Shuttle/ISS stack pitched down 45 degrees and no Orbiter thruster 
firings.  
 
 
F-10 There has been considerable progress in the area of work site dynamics stability 
analysis and modeling. The loads and training testbeds should help greatly to 
characterize the expected loads during the repairs as well as to train the 
astronauts. Preliminary limits on the force level, time duration of the force 
application, and time separation between discrete force applications of the various 
repair loads have been identified for the TPS tile repairs. However, there is a lack 
of detailed understanding on the possibility of repair-induced motions that 
potentially may result in the crew getting injured at the work site or additional 
damage to the hardware. 
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Table 8.1-1.   List of ORM Open Work (as of 10 June 2005) 
 
a) Final and complete definition and agreement on all the worksite dynamics forcing functions  
(force versus time profiles) due to the EVA astronaut repair operations on tile and RCC. 
 
b) Inclusion of the ISS flexible dynamics in the ER-developed Worksite Dynamics simulation used 
to predict relative motion between the Orbiter and the EVA astronauts. 
 
c) Independent cross-check comparisons between the ER-developed Worksite Dynamics 
simulation and the functionally equivalent EG-developed SOMBAT-based simulations for a 
representative set of common benchmark test cases. 
 
d) Simulation, using the ER-developed Worksite Dynamics simulation tool, of the relative motion 
between the Orbiter and the EVA astronauts using the final defined set of repair forcing 
functions. 
 
e) Analysis and evaluation of the relative motion dynamics to assess repair feasibility. 
 
f) Additional ORM stability margin simulation and analysis. 
 
g) Nominal SRMS clearance analysis. 
 
h) The definition and performance of a common test case, as part of the overall ORM verification 
process, to be used across the 1) VR Lab repair dynamics testbed, 2) the 3-DOF PBAF repair 
dynamics testbed and 3) the end-to-end integrated system dynamics simulation. Common test 
case results from each of the three environments should be compared and any major differences 
reconciled. 
 
i) Development of an ORM  Contingency Action Plan for performing on-orbit realtime ORM 
analysis of specific TPS tile or RCC repair contingencies. 
 
j) Development of an on-orbit realtime ORM monitoring strategy, plans and procedures. Such 
procedures would be used during the course of actually maneuvering the Orbiter to its repair 
position using the SRMS to evaluate the overall system state-of-health and to  do realtime 
assessments of the ORM performance. They will define what specific sensor data will be 
collected and processed to support the realtime monitoring of the ORM performance and the 
health of the combined dynamic stack. 
 
k) Finalization of the decision flow policy of the repair “access” options that would be employed 
prior to invoking the Contingency Shuttle Crew Support/Launch on Notice (CSCS/LON) 
contingency activity. 
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8.2 Recommendations 
The ORM Peer Review team has developed the following prioritized set of 
recommendations which represents the minimum set of ORM analytical and operational 
planning tasks needed to have the ORM in place as a viable contingency for STS-114. 
These prioritized recommendations are summarized, in a top-level fashion, in the STS-
114 Flight Readiness Review (FRR) ORM chart package which is provided for reference 
in Appendix C.  
 
R-1 Re-assess the ISS attitude control system design, employed for ORM operations, 
for both stability and performance  
 
The use of the high-fidelity SOMBAT-based time-domain simulation is 
recommended to show that the current ISS controller design has adequate stability 
robustness margins (i.e. gain and phase margins). Also use the high-fidelity 
simulation to demonstrate performance of ISS rate damping controller to recover 
the ISS/Orbiter stack from free drift rates, on the order of 0.18 degrees/second, at 
either the overnight park position or the repair position   
 
High fidelity simulations, using the flight-proven SOMBAT, should be used to 
demonstrate that the system, in free drift in each of these configurations, can be 
recovered by moving the SRMS to the nearest recoverable safe point, and 
implementing the rate damping controller. The high fidelity simulation model 
should include the damping and frequency uncertainties associated with the 
SRMS.  
 
 
R-2 Complete the independent validation of the ORM integrated end-to-end dynamic 
simulation, to include benchmarking with Virtual Reality (VR) laboratory 
dynamics simulation        
 
The planned, but as yet unexecuted, independent cross-check comparison runs 
between the ES/ER integrated WSD Simulation and EG-developed SOMBAT 
tool needs to be completed, using a set of common benchmark test cases. This 
particular item is also captured as Open Work item c), but its fundamental 
importance to reducing uncertainty and increasing confidence in the ORM 
modeling merits it being citied as a specific high-priority recommendation. Some 
comparisons already exist, but common end-to-end runs, using the same load 
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inputs, are needed. This work should preferably be completed prior to launch of 
STS-114.  
 
The ORM WG should define a common benchmark test case, as part of a unified 
approach to the overall ORM modeling/simulation verification process, to be 
performed/conducted across the following three elements: 1) VR Laboratory 
repair dynamics testbed, 2) the 3-Degree of Freedom (DOF) Precision Air 
Bearing Facility (PBAF) repair dynamics testbed and 3) the new ER-developed 
end-to-end integrated system dynamics simulation. Common test case results 
from each of these three environments should be compared and any major 
differences reconciled prior to the first use of the ORM.  
 
R-3 Complete ORM contingency planning to include definition and development of  
detailed procedures and protocols, especially for ORM abort scenarios. 
 
ORM contingency planning is critically needed to define:  
 
a)  the ORM state-of-health/dynamic behavior monitoring procedures and 
 protocols,  
 
b)  the specific Contingency Action Plan for performing on-orbit 
 analysis of worksite dynamic interactions,  
 
c)  and, on-orbit pre-repair dynamic  checks in the worksite environment and d) 
 FDIR checks/tests.    
 
Develop a contingency action plan that defines the real-time, on-orbit ORM 
analysis tasks that need to be completed, the people and phone numbers required, 
and the facilities that are necessary to support the ORM realtime analysis. Also, 
prior to launch the ORM realtime Contingency Action Plan needs to be simulated 
with appropriate personnel. Each of the real time models has been run, but there is 
not a case in which the team was asked about specific damage at an arbitrary 
location and then run the tools from beginning to end.  This simulation would 
allow Mission Control Center (MCC)/Mission Evaluation Room (MER) users to 
see this process and understand what limitations exist and also understand the 
resulting outputs.  At a minimum, a table-top paper simulation should be 
performed, by the ORM WG, of these realtime repair assessments.  
 
The SSP should consider implementing a hold at each maneuver waypoint to 
allow for realtime assessment of the integrated stack’s dynamics behavior and 
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performance. There needs to be a clear plan and procedure to do realtime 
assessment on how the ORM is progressing from a dynamics perspective. Define 
how, during the course of actually maneuvering the Orbiter to its repair position 
using the SRMS, the flight operations team will determine the overall system 
state-of-health and perform real-time assessments of the ORM performance. 
Define what specific sensor data will be collected and processed to support the 
monitoring of the ORM performance and the health of the combined dynamic 
stack.     
 
  The FDIR systems in the ISS, shuttle, SRMS, and SSRMS need to be examined 
for any potential conflicts in exercising this maneuver 
 
Fault scenarios, which describe potential loss of system’s stability, need to be 
identified from the moment of the Orbiter separation, at the start of the maneuver, 
and throughout the maneuver, including at all 13 waypoints. Particular attention 
must be given to the two parking positions.  These scenarios include, but are not 
limited to, loss of attitude control due to instabilities as well as hardware failure, 
and excessive and unstable motion of SRMS arms and joint angles. 
 
Metrics must be developed for assessing the health and safety of the system 
during the overall maneuver and repair. It is advisable to have these metrics at a 
system level and not simply rely on the existing fault detection systems on the ISS 
and SRMS, individually. However, if that is not possible, procedures for 
identifying system level faults must be developed and astronauts must be trained 
to properly implement these procedures. These procedures must support the 
decentralized nature of the fault detection approach. 
 
Protocols must be developed for each configuration of the stack, during the ORM, 
to define mode switching logic (from USTO to rate damping, for example) as well 
as to define feasible schemes to maneuver to  the nearest waypoint for safe 
recovery. These protocols should be implemented as soon as possible once a 
fault/instability is identified. It is best that these protocols are implemented with 
software within an FDIR system. However, if that is not possible, astronauts 
should be trained to implement these protocols in a timely and proper manner. 
   
Given uncertainties in the worksite dynamics, close clearances, and a general 
inability to undo repair mistakes, on-orbit checks of the worksite environment in a 
safe (not likely to lead to impact/damage) location prior to initiating an actual 
repair are recommended.  For example, the astronaut can be positioned near the 
repair site and survey motion relative to the site while sitting quiet, performing a 
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layback maneuver, and touching the wing with a mock execution of the repair 
steps.  These actions could refine repair operations and optimize likelihood of 
success. 
 
R-4 Complete the analysis and simulation of the repair worksite dynamic interaction 
(i.e. assess relative motions between the EVA astronaut and Orbiter). 
 
The ORM WG needs to finalize the complete definition and agreement on all the 
worksite dynamics forcing functions (force versus time profiles) due to the EVA 
astronaut repair operations on both TPS tile and the RCC locations.  
 
The ORM WG should take the steps necessary to include the modal-significant 
ISS flexible dynamics in the ER-developed Worksite Dynamics simulation used 
to predict relative motions between the Orbiter and the EVA astronauts. While 
some preliminary work has been performed to assess the impact of ISS flexibility, 
it is clear to the team that those results do not  provide a sufficient basis to ignore 
the potential impact of  ISS dynamic flexibility on relative motions between the 
Orbiter and the EVA astronauts.    
 
R-5 Fully document and communicate all ORM operational constraints and hazards to 
Astronaut Office and mission control center staff.  
 
The SSP should define and communicate (or re-communicate, as the case may be) 
an up-to-date summary of all ORM operational constraints, hazards, and risks to 
the flight crew, the Astronaut Office and the mission operations team to ensure all 
those parties are fully aware of the operational implications of loss of ISS attitude 
control during the ORM.          
 
For example, there is a need to document and communicate the fact that, if 
required during the ORM, an emergency Orbiter separation must be performed 
passively, using orbital dynamics with no thruster firings, from the overnight park 
position with the entire ISS/Orbiter stack attitude pitched down by 45 degrees.       
 
The SSP should, prior to launch, finalize the decision flow policy of the repair 
“access” options that would be employed prior to invoking the CSCS/LON 
contingency. The SSP should complete its assessment of the feasibility of 
employing the OBSS boom to effect repairs (i.e., primarily to determine if the 
OBSS provides a sufficiently stable base from which to perform the repairs), in a 
time frame to support the establishment of the repair access decision flow policy 
prior to launch of STS-114.       
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It is the team’s position that the above set of five NESC prioritized recommendations, 
represents the minimum set of ORM analytical and operational planning tasks, needed to 
be implemented in order for the ORM to be considered as a viable contingency for the 
STS-114 mission. Furthermore, the team’s position is that ORM contingency operations 
should not be invoked until, at a minimum, all five of the above prioritized 
recommendations have been addressed by the SSP. 
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9.0 Lessons Learned 
This NESC Consultation presented no lessons learned.
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10.0 Definition of Terms  
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship 
practices, training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, 
drawings, tools, equipment, facilities, resources, or material that 
result in preventing, minimizing, or limiting the potential for 
recurrence of a problem.  
Finding A conclusion based on facts established during the 
assessment/inspection by the investigating authority.  
 
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience 
may be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as 
in a mishap or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has 
real or assumed impact on operations; valid in that it is factually 
and technically correct; and applicable in that it identifies a 
specific design, process, or decision that reduces or limits the 
potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a positive result.  
 
Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the 
assessment/inspection that did not contribute to the problem, but if 
left uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or 
increase the severity should a mishap occur.  
 
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection. 
 
Recommendation An action identified by the assessment/inspection team to correct a 
root cause or deficiency identified during the investigation.  The 
recommendations may be used by the responsible C/P/P/O in the 
preparation of a corrective action plan.  
 
Root Cause Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first 
causal action or failure to act that could have been controlled 
systemically either by policy/practice/procedure or individual 
adherence to policy/practice/procedure. 
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11.0 List of Acronyms  
CMG Control Moment Gyroscope 
CSCS Contingency Shuttle Crew Support 
CSI Control-Structure Interaction 
dB Decibel 
DOF Degree of Freedom 
EG  Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Engineering 
Division at JSC 
ER Robotics Engineering Division at JSC  
EVA Extra Vehicular Activity 
FDIR Fault, Detection, Isolation, and Recovery 
FGB Functional Energy Block 
FRR Flight Readiness Review  
GN&C Guidance, Navigation & Control  
Hz hertz 
ISS International Space Station 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
LON Launch-on-Need 
MCC Mission Control Center 
MER Mission Evaluation Room 
MM Momentum Management  
NDE NESC Discipline Expert 
NESC NASA Engineering & Safety Center 
NRB NESC Review Board 
OBSS Orbiter Boom Sensor System  
ORM Orbiter Repair Maneuver 
PABF Precision Air Bearing Facility  
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PD Proportional-Derivative 
PWM Pulse Width Modulation 
RCC Reinforced Carbon-Carbon 
RS Russian Segment 
RTF Return-to-Flight 
SM Service Module 
SMARR Safety & Mission Assurance Readiness Review 
SOMBAT Station/Orbiter Multibody Berthing Analysis Tool  
SPRT Super Problem Resolution Team 
SRMS Shuttle Remote Manipulator System 
SSP Space Shuttle Project 
SSRMS Space Station Remote Manipulator System 
TEA Torque Equilibrium Attitude 
TPS Thermal Protection System 
USTO United States Thruster-Only  
VR Virtual Reality 
WG Working Group 
WSD Worksite Dynamics 
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12.0 Minority Report 
There are no dissenting opinions in this report. 
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Volume 2:  Appendices 
 
Appendix A.  NESC ITA/I Request Form (NESC-003-FM-01) 
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Appendix B.   NESC ORM Peer Review Agenda (8-10 June 2005) 
 
 
NESC ORM Peer Review Agenda 
(6 June 2005)    
 
All personnel listed are the team leads and responsible for 
assuring other team members, as appropriate, are in 
attendance. 
 
 
Day1 - Wednesday, June 8th  
Meeting Location: Building 16, Room 1123A 
 
8:45 am to 9:00 am  
Introductions & Review Objectives/Guidelines  
(Frank Bauer) 
 
9:00 am to 11:00am   
ORM Status Update, Technical Overview, Analysis Approach and Open Work  
(Curt Larsen/MO2 and Bill Spetch/OM5) 
 
11:00 am to 12 noon   
Discussion of the Integrated Simulation architecture (aka the "Common Sim") 
(Les Quiocho/ER7) ** subject to move**  
 
1pm to 2:30 pm  
Worksite Dynamics  
(Sean Cupitt/Lora Bailey/Kwun Siu (Ki)/Dina Barclay  
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2:30 pm to 5:00 pm  
Discussion of SRMS and SSRMS Dynamic Analysis Results 
(Liz Bains/ER7)  
5:00 pm to 6 pm 
NESC Team Caucus: Recap of Day 1 and Re-Plan for Day 2  
 
Day 2 - Thursday, June 9th  
Meeting Location: Building 4S, Room 1200 
 
9:00 am to 10:30 am  
Discussion of ISS GN&C (MM/AH) ORM Analysis Results   
(Louis  Nguyen/EG3)  
 
10:30 am to 12:00 noon  
Discussion of Independent Modeling and Simulation Plans/Results  
(Louis  Nguyen/EG3) 
 
1:00 pm to 3:00 pm  
SRMS/APAS Operations  
(Tim Briscoe/ES2)  
 
3:00 pm to 5:00 pm  
Discussion of ORM Risks/Fault Tolerance (Probability vs. Impact) 
(Todd Miller/NC)  
 
5:00 pm to ?pm 
NESC Team Caucus: Recap of Day 2 and Wrapup. (Also planning  for Day 3 
meetings)  
 
Day 3 - Friday, June 9th 
 
8:00 am to 10:00 am  
Meeting Location - Building 1, Room 720  
Question and Answer session for all ORM WG members 
(all WG members)  
Note: This portion of 
the Peer Review did not 
take place. 
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10:00 am to 12:00 noon (IF NEEDED)  
Meeting Location - Building 1, Room 715F  
 
Wrapup  
(Curt Larsen and Bill Spetch)  
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Appendix C.  ORM STS-114 FRR Chart Package  
(dated 27 June 2005) 
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This briefing is for status only and does not represent complete engineering data analysis 1
28-29 June 05Shuttle/ISS Orbiter Repair Maneuver
• Description and Scope:
– In response to concerns over the 
complex dynamics and control of 
the Orbiter and ISS during the 
Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) 
the NESC GN&C SPRT 
conducted a pre-RTF Peer 
Review of the ORM Working 
Group’s modeling and analysis 
efforts at JSC on 8-10 June 2005
Dennehy
04-051-E
• Background 
– ORM is a complex contingency operation with close proximity movements 
of flight structures, limited back-out opportunities and visibility, and high 
potential for adverse dynamic interactions between control systems, 
SRMS, SSRMS, and structure, possibly resulting in large or unstable 
relative motion between the Orbiter, the EVA Astronauts, and the ISS
 
This briefing is for status only and does not represent complete engineering data analysis 2
28-29 June 05Shuttle/ISS Orbiter Repair Maneuver
• Background (continued)
• ORM consists of new and unfamiliar operations that are complex and pose risks 
(both know and unknown) to the crew and flight systems. 
• ORM is a “first of a kind” operation whose execution will require both the flight 
hardware and the crew to operate in a non-standard manner in regimes that are  
significantly outside the nominal operational experiences.
• Results:
– NESC White Paper Report developed summarizing ORM Peer Review findings and 
recommendations 
– Peer review team consensus is that there remains critical open work that 
absolutely must be completed prior to first use of ORM 
– The team also found that that lack of a dedicated full time ORM Lead System 
Engineer has impacted, and continues to impact, the integration and prioritization 
of open ORM analytical and operational planning work
– The team found that the on-orbit contingency decision flow process/policy  
defining specifically when the ORM will be invoked had not been finalized 
– The team has developed the following prioritized set of recommendations which 
represents the minimum set of ORM analytical and operational planning tasks  
needed to have the ORM in place as a viable contingency for STS-114
04-051-E
Dennehy
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This briefing is for status only and does not represent complete engineering data analysis 3
28-29 June 05Shuttle/ISS Orbiter Repair Maneuver
• Results (continued):
• Prioritized set of NESC recommendations on the ORM:
- #1 Priority: Re-assessment of ISS attitude control system design and 
performance.   Use high-fidelity simulation to show current design has 
adequate stability robustness margins. Also use high-fidelity 
simulation to demonstrate performance of ISS rate damping controller 
to recover stack from free drift rates at either the overnight park 
position or the repair position  
- #2 Priority: Complete the independent validation of the ORM 
integrated end-to-end dynamic simulation, to include benchmarking 
with Virtual Reality (VR) laboratory dynamics simulation       
- #3 Priority: Complete ORM contingency planning to include definition 
of: a) the ORM state-of-health/dynamic behavior monitoring 
procedures and protocols, b) the specific Contingency Action Plan for 
performing on-orbit analysis of worksite dynamic interactions, c) on-
orbit pre-repair dynamic checks in the worksite environment and d) 
Failure Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) checks/tests   
04-051-E
Dennehy
 
This briefing is for status only and does not represent complete engineering data analysis 4
28-29 June 05Shuttle/ISS Orbiter Repair Maneuver
• Results (continued):
- #4 Priority: Complete the analysis and simulation of the repair worksite dynamic 
interaction (i.e. assess relative motions between the EVA astronaut and Orbiter)
- #5 Priority: Fully document and communicate all ORM operational constraints 
and hazards to Astronaut Office and mission control center staff
- For example, need to document and communicate the fact that, if required 
during the ORM, an emergency Orbiter separation must be performed 
passively, using orbital dynamics with no thruster firings, from the overnight 
park position with the entire stack pitch down 45 degrees      
04-051-E
Dennehy
• Issues/constraints/open work:
– The set of five NESC prioritized recommendations, representing the minimum set of 
ORM analytical and operational planning tasks, need to be implemented in order for 
the ORM to be considered as a viable contingency for STS-114
• Flight Rationale/ Risk Assessment:
• ORM contingency operations should not be invoked until, at a minimum, all  
NESC prioritized recommendations have been addressed
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Appendix D.  April 2005 ORM Status Report   
 
Status Report 
Orbiter Repair Maneuver (a.k.a. Orbiter “Flip” Maneuver) 
Frank H. Bauer, NESC GN&C SPRT 
3/31/05 
 
 
The intent of this report is to provide a status on the NASA JSC initiative to perform a 
series of re-orientation maneuvers on the Space Shuttle using the Space Shuttle Remote 
Manipulator to support Orbiter Repair.  The primary requirement for this very 
challenging maneuver is to inspect remote portions of the RCC and ceramic tile for 
damage and, if damage is observed, to enable vehicle repair.  Repair would be 
accomplished by undocking from the ISS using the Shuttle RMS, reorienting the Shuttle 
using the Shuttle RMS and then allowing astronauts on the Space Station Remote 
Manipulator to complete the repair.  It should be noted that this specific maneuver will 
only be required for a small subset of the RCC and ceramic tile repair scenarios.   
 
Executive Summary 
 
Several members of the NESC Guidance, Navigation and Control SPRT have been 
providing high-level oversight of the technical and programmatic activities surrounding 
the Orbiter Repair Maneuver since July 2004.  Members of the SPRT attended a 
comprehensive NESC review at NASA JSC on August 31-Sept 2, 2004.  In addition, as 
time permits, SPRT team members participate in the ORM weekly teleconferences, get 
periodic status updates from JSC-resident SPRT members Louis Nguyen and Tuyen Hua, 
they review material on the ORM web site, and Frank Bauer, the out-going GN&C NDE, 
has performed face-to-face status discussions with the ORM Shuttle Program Office 
leads Ladonna Miller and Curt Larsen.   
 
The ORM activity represents a challenging control-structure interaction problem.  
Normally, the Shuttle RMS lifts and deploys payloads with mass and inertias much 
smaller than the Shuttle.  In all cases to-date, the Shuttle can be thought of as an “infinite 
mass” that reacts against the much smaller payload.  The Shuttle RMS uses this “infinite” 
reactive mass to help move the payload in the proper position (translation and 
orientation).  However, for the ORM, the Shuttle becomes the payload that reacts against 
the ISS.  It should be noted that the largest payload attached to the Shuttle RMS to-date is 
the FGB.  The FGB mass is approximately an order of magnitude less than the Shuttle 
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mass.  So extrapolation from an FGB payload to the Shuttle as a payload is a quite 
daunting challenge. 
 
It is the NESC team’s opinion that the ORM team are currently on the right path to 
analytically validate the viability of whether this end-to-end system can successfully 
perform an ORM; however, the initiative is proceeding much slower than anticipated.  
The primary cause of this delay resulted from the engineering community (i.e. EG, ER 
and ES) needing to prioritize their human resources on primary Shuttle Return to Flight 
(RTF) initiatives.  Now that sufficient resources are available to move forward, ORM 
end-to-end analysis has begun in earnest to assess the stability of the system (Shuttle, 
SRMS, etc.) while under the influence of worksite dynamic interaction (crew motion and 
vehicle repair).   
 
Specific major ORM-related activities performed to date, with NESC team 
recommendations on these follow: 
 
1) ISS Russian Segment Maneuver Control System Modification---requires a 
new thruster control system (phase plane parameter changes and development of 
“cyclogram”) to minimize Shuttle RMS brake slip.  ISS controller modifications 
have been developed and have been tested on-orbit.  NESC GN&C SPRT 
comments:  Good first step in ORM development 
 
2) ORM Detailed Test Objective (DTO)---a DTO was planned for STS-121 (2nd 
flight of shuttle after return to flight) while docked to the ISS.  The intent of this 
DTO was to validate some aspects of the ORM activity, particularly specific 
Shuttle RMS orientations with the Shuttle acting as the payload.  This DTO was 
not approved by the Joint Shuttle/ISS Program Office due to concerns regarding 
mission risk and analytic maturity.  The NESC team was following this initiative 
quite closely.  The NESC team was quite concerned about proceeding forward 
with this DTO, given the analytic maturity and mission (ISS and Shuttle) risk.  
They concur with the Program Office decision on this matter. 
 
3) Worksite stability---models of crew member dynamics and repair dynamics are 
currently being developed.  The end-to-end analysis of the entire system (Shuttle 
Controller, ISS Controller, Shuttle RMS controller, Station ISS controller and 
worksite dynamics) has not been completed to date.  NESC reaction:  Obviously, 
these analyses need to be completed before the ORM can be contemplated for use.  
Once the analyses are complete, the NESC team would like to have a second 
comprehensive review of the analysis efforts, similar to the depth provided at the 
August 2004 meeting.  Given that this maneuver and subsequent repair have the 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Consultation Report 
Document #: 
RP-05-88 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
International Space Station (ISS)/Shuttle “Flip” 
Maneuver for Thermal Protection System (TPS) Repair 
Technical Consultation Report 
Page #: 
51 of 52 
 
NESC Request No. 04-034-E 
potential for catastrophic loss of the Shuttle and ISS, plans to independently 
validate these models are recommended by the NESC prior to their use.    
 
4) Contingency decision to use of ORM during future Shuttle missions---given 
that the ORM has yet to be validated, there is significant concern within the 
NESC GN&C SPRT that, in the event that a Shuttle tile problem is observed, a 
go-ahead to proceed with the ORM may be operationally invoked.  The NESC 
GN&C team does not support this given the immature state of the analyses.  
Further, we have recently learned that ORM contingency procedures are in place 
for STS-114.  It is our recommendation to the NESC Review Board that the ORM 
contingency operations procedures not be invoked until the system validation is 
complete and the NESC has concurred with the validation and contingency 
operations plan.    
 
The above represents an executive summary of the ORM plans and NESC GN&C SPRT 
thoughts and recommendations to date.  This team will continue to monitor the progress 
of the ORM activities and report back to the NESC as appropriate.  If more detailed 
discussions on this topic are required, please contact Frank Bauer at 
frank.bauer@nasa.gov or 202-358-0897.  Additional background material is shown on 
the next few pages. 
 
The NESC GN&C SPRT would like to thank the entire ORM team and the ORM leads, 
Ladonna Miller and Curt Larsen from the Shuttle Program Office and Bill Spetch from  
the ISS Program Office, for their openness and frank dialog throughout our oversight 
activity.  This was much appreciated and was crucial in getting a good understanding of 
the ORM analyses, plans and potential risks. 
 
 
<signed> 
Frank H. Bauer 
NESC GN&C SPRT 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Consultation Report 
Document #: 
RP-05-88 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
International Space Station (ISS)/Shuttle “Flip” 
Maneuver for Thermal Protection System (TPS) Repair 
Technical Consultation Report 
Page #: 
52 of 52 
 
NESC Request No. 04-034-E 
 
Approval and Document Revision History 
Approved: Original signed on file  8-8-05
 NESC Director Date 
 
Version Description of Revision Office of Primary 
Responsibility 
Effective 
Date 
1.0 Initial Release Principal Engineer’s 
Office 
8-8-05 
 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
2.  REPORT TYPE 
Technical Memorandum
 4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE
International Space Station/Shuttle “Flip” Maneuver for Thermal 
Protection System Repair  Consultation Report
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
 6.  AUTHOR(S)
Dennehy, Cornelius J.; Bauer, Frank; Bilimoria, Karl D.;
Dillman, Dennis B.; Gilbert, Michael G.; Hagopian, Michael; Hua, Tuyen; 
Leggett, Jay A.; Maghami, Peiman G.; Mangus, David J.; Starin, Scott R.
 7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA  23681-2199
 9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC  20546-0001
 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
     REPORT NUMBER                      L-19649
NESC-RP-05-88/04-034-E
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
NASA
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified - Unlimited
Subject Category:  16
Availability:  NASA CASI (443) 757-5802
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
STI Help Desk (email:  help@sti.nasa.gov)
14. ABSTRACT
The intent of this Technical Consultation Report is to document the finding and recommendations of the NESC Orbiter Repair 
Maneuver (ORM) Peer Review conducted at NASA’s Johnson Space Center (JSC) with the ORM Working Group (WG) over 
the period 8-10 June 2005.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
EVA; FlipManeuver; ORM; RCC; SSRMS; TPS
18. NUMBER
      OF 
      PAGES
57
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(443) 757-5802
a.  REPORT
U
c. THIS PAGE
U
b. ABSTRACT
U
17. LIMITATION OF 
      ABSTRACT
UU
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
3.  DATES COVERED (From - To)
Mar. 2004-July 2005
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
869021.06.07.03.99
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT
      NUMBER(S)
NASA/TM-2009-215710
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person 
shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1.  REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
04 - 200901-
